China Accelerates Overseas Mining M&A, Acquisition Value Hits Highest Since 2018 in First Three Quarters
nashnova research
China spent $8.8 billion on overseas mining acquisitions in the first three quarters alone, topping any full year since 2018. Beijing is shifting from firm-level dealmaking to a state-coordinated model that treats mineral supply as a geopolitical priority.
What does the $8.8 billion figure tell us?
Rhodium Group data show China's overseas mining acquisitions reached $8.8 billion in the first nine months — already exceeding every full-year total since 2018.
This means → the pace is not a recovery to normal. It marks a step-change in scale.
Eurasia Group projects that China's upstream critical-mineral outbound investment between 2026 and 2030 will roughly double the 2021–2025 level.
Why shift from company-led deals to state coordination?
Eurasia Group's China director Dan Wang calls the shift a "state-coordinated global mining strategy," replacing the earlier model of fragmented corporate decision-making.
In April, Beijing set up a dedicated overseas bureau to coordinate state-owned enterprises' outbound investment. In July, it launched a mineral-investment coordination platform offering compliance, risk-management, and market-intelligence support. Multiple ministries and policy banks are now part of the system.
In plain terms = individual miners used to negotiate abroad on their own; now the state sets the stage and deploys resources as a unified force, seeking greater scale and synergy.
Wang also cautions that longer approval chains could raise corruption risks and weigh on returns.
Where does Beijing draw the red line?
Wang says Beijing treats 70% import dependence as an implicit red line. Copper, lithium, cobalt, nickel, bauxite, and iron ore all hit that threshold.
This means → the expansion logic is driven by national security, not commercial profit. Wang notes the pursuit of scale and "ultimate geopolitical power" may override investment risk and profitability.
Rhodium analyst Armand Meyer adds that acquisitions focus on minerals where China's domestic reserves fall short — lithium, nickel, and cobalt during the EV boom, plus gold in recent years.
Can dominance in refining be used as a weapon?
The IEA estimates China produces roughly 92% of the world's refined rare earths.
Payne Institute's Brad Handler says this gives Beijing two levers: restrict supply, or crush prices to drive competitors out — "If a rival builds a new refinery, China can ramp up capacity, flood the market, and push prices to uneconomic levels."
In plain terms = it is not just about owning mines. It is about the fact that the world's ore must pass through Chinese plants to become usable material — that is the real chokepoint.
How hard do export controls bite?
China imposed export controls on seven medium- and heavy-rare-earth products starting last year, requiring exporters to apply for licenses.
Japan felt the sharpest impact: Chinese exports of yttrium oxide to Japan plunged from 51,000 kg last September to just 4,000 kg this September — a drop exceeding 90%.
This means → export controls are not a slow squeeze. They can push a downstream country toward inventory exhaustion within months. Yttrium oxide — a rare-earth material widely used in displays and semiconductor manufacturing — demonstrated that pressure on Japan in real time.
Where is the deepest tension?
A growing number of resource-rich countries now demand that foreign partners refine minerals locally rather than ship raw ore.
This reflects a structural clash: refining is precisely the segment where China holds its strongest global advantage — what resource states want back is exactly what Beijing least wants to give up.
Put simply = resource nations say "if you want our ore, build the plant here"; China says "our plants are the backbone of the entire chain." The contest between the two sides centers on this very link.
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