China's Mineral Controls Constrain EU Rearmament as Alternative Supply Chain Development Lags Behind
Taylor Wilson
Of the EU's 34 critical raw materials, 17 depend on China for at least 70% of global mining or refining — and 8 are already under Beijing's export controls, putting the raw-material foundation of European rearmament in a rival's hands.
What exactly does China control?
EUISS analyst Joris Teer flags the numbers: of 34 critical raw materials, 17 rely on China for at least 70% of global extraction or refining.
Eight of those are already under Chinese export controls, spanning defence, aerospace and battery supply chains.
This means → China does not even need to cut supply. Simply demonstrating the *ability* to cut already raises its geopolitical leverage.
Why is Europe feeling the squeeze now?
The ongoing war in Ukraine plus uncertainty over U.S. security commitments are pushing European governments to ramp up military spending.
But rearmament requires physical materials — cobalt for jet engines and defence alloys, rare earths for precision guidance — and every link runs through Chinese supply chains.
In plain terms = Europe wants to build more weapons, yet most of the raw ingredients come from the very rival it is arming against.
Are defence firms ready?
Rheinmetall says it holds years' worth of critical-material stockpiles and runs an IT system to monitor consumption across the group in real time.
IISS senior fellow Maria Shagina warns that stockpiles are only a buffer. They cannot fix a structural problem — alternative sources need years to reach scale.
This reflects a gap: short-term corporate preparedness versus the long-term fragility of the entire supply chain.
Has EU policy kept pace?
The 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act sets 2030 targets for domestic extraction, processing and recycling, caps single-country dependence at 65%, and backs it with a €3 billion fund.
But the European Court of Auditors notes the 2030 targets are non-binding, and the EU remains far from meeting them.
Cobalt Institute's Michael Blakeney puts it bluntly: "Europe has one foot in, one foot out. It says the right things but does contradictory things."
Can coordination with the U.S. close the gap?
The EU signed a critical-minerals supply coordination deal with the U.S. in April; in early June, member states authorised the Commission to join the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative, which aligns investment and export-control policies.
Shagina's assessment is clear: the U.S. has deployed more capital, taken bigger financial risks, and in some cases secured capacity through equity stakes — Europe is more conservative and "at a relative disadvantage in the race for critical minerals."
This means → The coordination framework exists on paper, but without matching European capital, it stays on paper.
What is the next critical checkpoint?
Teer urges making the U.S.–EU–Japan trilateral talks the "core" of a broader alliance, naming Malaysia, the DRC, Brazil, Indonesia and India as priority partners.
He also calls on the EU to activate its anti-coercion instrument — tariffs and restrictions in response to Chinese economic pressure.
In plain terms = 2030 is the deadline Europe set for itself. Whether it can actually build alternative supply chains before then determines whether rearmament is policy or slogan.
Content is for reference only, not financial advice.