Douyin E-Commerce GMV Growth Slows to ~20% in H1 2026, Deceleration Continues
N.R. Finch
Douyin's e-commerce arm saw GMV growth slow to roughly 20% in H1 2026, down from ~30% in 2025, per a 36Kr exclusive; its 618 shopping festival GMV rose about 19% year-on-year — missing the internal target of 24%–25% — prompting a reset of second-half goals.
Growth halving every year — what does the curve tell us?
Douyin e-commerce GMV growth has fallen from 220% in 2022 to 80% in 2023, 46% in 2024, ~30% in 2025, and under 20% in H1 2026.
This means → Douyin e-commerce has shifted from explosive expansion to a "still beating the market, but growth halves each year" phase. The hypergrowth dividend is over.
The 618 festival delivered roughly 19% YoY growth, below the 24%–25% internal target. Per 36Kr, the company is now revising its H2 growth goals downward.
Bigger coupons — who actually benefited?
During 618, Douyin raised coupon tiers — ¥150 / ¥500 bumped to ¥200 / ¥600 — and added high-value coupons at ¥3,000 / ¥5,000 / ¥6,000. The spend-and-save threshold improved from "spend ¥2,000, save ¥200" to "spend ¥2,000, save ¥300."
In plain terms = the platform used heavier subsidies to push consumers toward pricier items — a play to mine higher average order value in a saturated market.
The outcome was stark: the top three spots on the 618 beauty chart went to Estée Lauder, Helena Rubinstein, and La Mer. Domestic brands slipped in ranking.
How much of the shelf mall's "incremental" GMV is real?
Douyin e-commerce hit roughly ¥4.4 trillion in 2025 GMV. The official line puts shelf-based e-commerce — its in-app mall — at 40%–50% of that total. But multiple former employees told 36Kr that after stripping out traffic driven by short videos and livestreams, user-initiated search-and-buy transactions accounted for only about 10% of total GMV as of Q3 2025, up from roughly 7% before that.
One former mall employee said: "We ran an A/B test. The mall added no incremental volume — it just shifted purchases from the content feed onto the shelf."
This means → the mall's headline share looks large, but the pure increment from users actively "searching for products" remains slim. The content feed is still the core transaction engine.
Ocean Engine folded into e-commerce — what changed in the traffic rules?
In April 2025, ByteDance merged its Ocean Engine ad-buying team (巨量千川) into Douyin e-commerce as a second-tier unit; KA direct-sales and vertical-operations teams followed in September. Ocean Engine's mandate shifted from maximizing ad revenue alone to maximizing GMV and ad revenue jointly.
In May 2025, the platform replaced "standard bidding" with "global bidding," letting its algorithm draw on both organic and paid traffic simultaneously. In plain terms = the concept of "organic reach" was diluted — merchants' room to acquire free traffic shrank.
This reflects a deeper structural tension: after the merger, "seeding" (brand awareness) and "selling" (conversion) sit in separate teams with weaker coordination. Marketing consultant Li Zi'ang told 36Kr that some brands now see audience overlap between the two efforts of under 10%.
Doubao and Hongguo enter e-commerce — where do they actually stand?
As of March 2026, Doubao (豆包, ByteDance's AI chatbot) had roughly 345 million MAU; Hongguo (紅果, its short-drama app) had roughly 315 million MAU. Both began plugging into e-commerce around October 2025; Hongguo formally set up a "Hongguo E-commerce" unit in April 2026.
Per a Nomura expert-call transcript, Hongguo generated roughly ¥15 billion in e-commerce GMV by June 2026 — a figure Hongguo itself called inaccurate. Doubao launched an AI shopping feature called "Pick for You" in May, but its 618 GMV was only about ¥100 million.
This means → the user bases are massive, but e-commerce conversion is still in its earliest stage. As Li Zi'ang put it: "E-commerce is a very practical business; AI is fundamentally about the future, not the present."
Content is for reference only, not financial advice.