Dutch Report: China's Intervention in Strategic Industries Like Chips Poses Systemic Threat
Alina Collins
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies labels China's interference in Dutch semiconductors, maritime, and aerospace industries a systemic, long-term threat, calling for a national coordination framework beyond existing export controls.
Why does the report rank semiconductors as the highest-risk sector?
China's motivation is strongest, its track record of targeting is densest, and the potential consequences are most severe — all three indicators top the list across the three sectors examined.
ASML's monopoly in EUV lithography — machines that etch chip circuits with extreme-ultraviolet light — and TSMC's dominance in advanced-node manufacturing are identified as the two most critical "chokepoints" in the global supply chain.
This means → any interference at these two nodes ripples beyond the Netherlands across the entire global chip manufacturing chain.
What interference tools does China use?
The report frames interference as a state-directed, coordinated strategy, spanning economic coercion, digital and information operations, physical interference, legal pressure (termed "lawfare"), and talent-based technology theft.
In plain terms = these are not isolated espionage incidents but a toolkit — different tools matched to each sector's specific vulnerabilities.
The report embeds these methods within industrial policies such as "Made in China 2025" and "China Standards 2035," treating them as components of a long-term national strategy.
What documented cases does the report cite?
ASML / XTAL case: a former ASML employee founded a company in the U.S.; a Dutch court ruled it stole ASML source code. A separate employee carried chip-equipment information to Huawei.
NXP breach: a China-linked hacking group dubbed "APT Chimera" lurked inside NXP's network for over two years before detection, continuously extracting secrets.
Nexperia: owned by China's Wingtech, the Dutch government took control of the company in October 2025.
How large is the economic leverage?
Despite active export controls, China still accounts for 15–20% of ASML's revenue; NXP's China exports reached 36% of sales in 2024.
Raw-material dependence is starker: 93% of gallium and 84% of germanium needed for chip production are mined by Chinese firms.
This means → China is simultaneously a major customer of Dutch chip companies and the gatekeeper of critical upstream materials — a two-way economic lever.
How risky are the other two sectors?
Maritime is rated "high" risk, with total revenue of roughly €94 billion; expected interference takes the form of cyber-espionage and targeted disruption rather than overt sabotage.
Aerospace is rated "medium-high," driven primarily by China's motivation to close technology gaps through talent poaching and IP theft.
The report cites Dutch sinologist Ardi Bouwers: gaining geopolitical advantage in emerging technologies is one of Beijing's top domestic priorities.
Does the report consider current defenses sufficient?
The conclusion: export controls and investment screening are necessary but insufficient, with clear gaps in knowledge-flow oversight, talent-mobility controls, and cross-sector coordination.
The report calls for a national coordination and intelligence-sharing architecture, mandatory risk-based security standards, and a public-private resilience fund.
These measures are designed to complement the Netherlands' "Beethoven Plan" — the Dutch government's €2.5 billion program to strengthen domestic chip production.
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