U.S. Restricts Exports of Tungsten Scrap and Battery Black Mass, Invoking Defense Production Act
Alina Collins
The Commerce Department on August 6 ordered 100% domestic allocation of tungsten scrap and lithium-ion battery black mass, banning all exports under emergency powers invoked through the Defense Production Act. This means → critical minerals have joined chips as a front-line lever in the US-China strategic contest.
What exactly does this rule ban?
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) requires companies to sell 100% of monthly tungsten scrap and black mass — the mixed material recovered from crushing spent lithium-ion batteries — to domestic buyers. No exports allowed.
The rule takes effect 21 days after publication, lasts 386 days, and BIS can extend or adjust it.
Companies may apply for case-by-case waivers — for instance, sending material abroad for processing and returning it to the US — but must comply while approval is pending.
Why did BIS skip the normal process?
BIS invoked emergency powers under the Defense Production Act of 1950, bypassing the standard public-comment period.
The direct trigger: a July 30 presidential finding that recyclable critical minerals qualify as "scarce and critical materials essential to the national defense."
In plain terms = the normal rulemaking track takes months. BIS concluded that every extra day of delay meant more scrap flowing overseas, so it chose to ban first, consult later.
Why is tungsten the strongest signal here?
Tungsten is essential for armor-piercing ammunition, cutting tools, and semiconductor manufacturing — yet the US has had no domestic mine production for over a decade, relying entirely on imports.
China controls roughly 80% of global tungsten mine supply; its share of processing capacity is even higher.
The Pentagon has set a January 1, 2027 deadline to stop purchasing Chinese-origin tungsten. This means → the US has fewer than five months to stand up alternative supply.
China placed tungsten on its export-control list in February 2025 and tightened rare-earth export licenses in October — both sides are weaponizing minerals.
What is the real purpose of the black mass restriction?
The US accounts for only about 9% of global black mass output — a small share.
This means → the domestic-allocation mandate is less about feeding US industry and more about cutting off Chinese refiners' access — even a small volume denied is a volume the other side cannot process.
The White House has flagged recycled rare-earth magnets and other end-of-life materials as the next targets, signaling that tungsten and black mass are the start of a policy sequence, not the end.
Can this solve the underlying problem?
Restricting scrap exports buys time but cannot substitute for real capacity rebuilding.
Rebuilding US mining and processing capability will take years, and even with expedited permitting and Pentagon funding, it is unlikely to close the gap China built over decades in the near term.
In plain terms = this is a "stop the bleeding, then rebuild the blood supply" policy — the tourniquet is on, but the timeline for regeneration remains unclear.
Content is for reference only, not financial advice.