Huachuang's Zhang Yu: Six Dimensions of Impact from New Property Policies — Land Revenue and Loan Disbursement Both Under Pressure
nashnova research
On August 28 multiple ministries released a suite of new property-sector rules. Huachuang Securities analyst Zhang Yu's team assessed the impact across six dimensions — fiscal, household, developer, banking, economic, and pricing — and flagged land-transfer revenue and bank lending as the two lines under clearest pressure.
Where does the money come from? Land revenue gets stretched and squeezed
The new policy lets developers pay land-transfer fees in installments, with ratios and timelines set by local governments. This means → local authorities will wait longer to collect the same land payment, disrupting their cash-flow rhythm.
Under the completed-home sales model — where homes must be finished before they can be sold — developer capital turnover slows. To preserve project returns, land prices may need to fall to attract bidders.
Local land-transfer revenue stood at ¥4.15 trillion in 2025. If that shrinks without offsetting sources, fiscal spending growth faces downward pressure.
The report flags local-tax adjustments and government-bond issuance as potential alternatives. In plain terms = if land revenue shrinks, the money has to come from another pocket.
What changes for homebuyers? Payment deferred, delivery risk sharply reduced
Completed-home projects adopt a deposit system: developers may collect a small deposit after receiving a construction permit; mortgages are disbursed only after sales registration.
For presale projects, mortgages must wait until the project passes completion filing. This means → bank funds no longer enter unfinished projects, fundamentally lowering the buyer's delivery risk.
In plain terms = the old model was "pay first, wait for the house." The new model is "see the house first, then pay the bulk."
Can developers still run high-turnover? No — they need their own capital now
Under the old model, with total sales proceeds at 1, land cost 0.6, and development cost 0.3, presale revenue covered all costs and even freed cash for the next project.
Under the new completed-home model, first-year inflows are roughly 0.15 (deposit 0.05 + loan drawdown 0.1), while land payments due are 0.2 — a gap of about 0.05. This means → developers must commit their own equity; the leveraged high-turnover playbook is over.
Operating risk shifts too: presales locked in revenue at a known price. Now the bulk of proceeds arrive only after completion — if prices swing by then, revenue becomes uncertain, including price risk on unsold units and default risk on deposited units.
What happens to banks? Both deposits and lending slow down
Deposit side: the report gauges household deposit mobilization by the ratio of rolling 12-month new household deposits to new M2 (higher ratio = more money sitting idle in savings rather than flowing to investment or consumption).
Using 2025 data — presale volume ¥5.3 trillion, original down-payment ratio 80%, completed-home deposit ratio 5% — deposit mobilization slows by roughly 14.9 percentage points. In plain terms = more money stays parked in household deposits, which is a short-term headwind for equity valuations.
Lending side: mortgage disbursement is pushed significantly later; development loans must be released in tranches tied to construction progress — overall lending pace slows materially.
Economy and prices — where do they go? Two forces pull in opposite directions
Property investment: developers will likely bid for land more cautiously, but key details — whether completed-home sales become mandatory, how installment terms work — remain unclear, making the trajectory hard to call.
Urban renewal: the new rules require project loans to be backed by sufficient operating income to cover principal and interest, and ban loan funds from being used to pay land-transfer fees or upfront demolition costs. This reflects a policy move to shut down idle capital loops in urban-renewal projects.
Home prices: on the supply side, cautious land acquisition → slower new-home supply → helps digest inventory (as of July, the completed-home inventory-to-sales ratio was 7.21 months, still historically elevated). On the demand side, friendlier payment terms may boost buyer willingness — but fiscal pressure → weaker economic demand → lower household income → negative for prices. The two forces run in opposite directions; the outcome hinges on how the policy details land.
市场有风险，内容仅供研究参考，不构成投资建议。