U.S. Slows Aviation Parts Export Licenses to China as Trade Negotiation Leverage
nashnova research
The U.S. Commerce Department has slowed approvals for aviation-part exports to China in recent weeks, turning Beijing's dependence on American aerospace suppliers into a bargaining chip — forming a two-way standoff with China's rare-earth controls.
What exactly has the U.S. done?
Commerce has slowed — not halted — the approval process for aviation-part export licenses to China, effectively letting applications sit.
A draft export rule is in the works: it would set lower trigger thresholds for restricting sales of landing gear and other parts, and add new license requirements for suppliers such as ExxonMobil to export aviation hydraulic fluid.
Commerce has also capped the number of parts licenses issued to COMAC (Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China, the country's sole large commercial-jet maker) to prevent stockpiling.
This means → Washington's playbook is not a blanket cut-off but a controlled throttle — parts still flow, but the U.S. sets the pace.
Why single out aviation parts?
Chinese airlines' fleets of Boeing and Airbus jets, along with COMAC's plans to mass-produce its own commercial aircraft, are heavily dependent on U.S.-supplied components.
In plain terms = buying a plane is just the start; decades of maintenance and replacement parts all run through the original supply chain — and that is the card Washington holds.
China last spring agreed to buy 200 Boeing jets — Boeing's first major Chinese order in nearly a decade — and asked for a multi-year spare-parts guarantee, which the U.S. has been slow to grant.
This reflects a deliberate shift: Washington is turning after-sale support from a commercial obligation into negotiating leverage, not just a trade-friction side effect.
How do rare earths and aviation parts create a two-way standoff?
The U.S. uses aviation parts to offset Beijing's grip on rare-earth minerals — critical inputs for American automaking, chip production, and aerospace.
Last year, as trade tensions escalated, Washington suspended export licenses for GE Aerospace engines and Honeywell products bound for China.
China's rare-earth export controls are biting back: producers of thermal-barrier coating spray materials — coatings applied to engine blades to resist extreme heat — still face delivery delays due to rare-earth supply disruptions.
Put simply = each side holds a chokepoint on the other — the U.S. controls parts, China controls raw materials, and who blinks first depends on who needs a deal more urgently.
Where do the negotiations stand now?
U.S. and Chinese officials held talks in New York and Washington in September; following President Xi Jinping's visit to the U.S. last week, both sides agreed to cut tariffs on selected goods.
The trade truce, originally set to expire on November 10, has been extended to January 10, 2027, buying more negotiating time.
A Boeing spokesperson said: "Subject to U.S. export requirements, Boeing is committed to providing Chinese airlines with the parts and service support they need, as we have for decades."
This means → whether aviation parts prove to be effective leverage hinges on one key test: can the two sides reach a substantive exchange on rare earths and supply chains? The truce extension bought time — it has not yet bought a result.
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